Sorting, Selection, and Industry  Shakeouts by Thompson, Peter & Pintea, Mihaela
Florida International University
FIU Digital Commons
Economics Research Working Paper Series Department of Economics
7-2-2007
Sorting, Selection, and Industry Shakeouts
Peter Thompson
Department of Economics, Florida International University, thompsop@fiu.edu
Mihaela Pintea
Department of Economics, Florida International University, pinteam@fiu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/economics_wps
This work is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Economics at FIU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Economics Research Working Paper Series by an authorized administrator of FIU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
dcc@fiu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thompson, Peter and Pintea, Mihaela, "Sorting, Selection, and Industry Shakeouts" (2007). Economics Research Working Paper Series.
Paper 51.
http://digitalcommons.fiu.edu/economics_wps/51
Sorting, Selection, and Industry 
Shakeouts 
Peter Thompson and Mihaela Pintea* 
Florida International University 
March 2007 
 
A number of plausible theories offer explanations for the propensity of many young in-
dustries to undergo a shakeout phase, during which the number of firms declines sharply 
in the face of continued rising output. However, none of the theories considers the role of 
labor market sorting. This paper presents a model in which individual abilities are com-
plements in production, but frictions permit only gradual sorting among firms. The qual-
ity distribution of firms becomes wider over time, inducing exit of firms that have ended 
up with predominantly low-quality workers. The model does not ensure that a shakeout 
takes place, but when it does it will be characterized by rising output alongside a declin-
ing price, an increasing average wage, and a widening of the distributions across firms of 
employment, output, productivity and average wages.  
  
JEL Classifications:  L1, J62. 
Keywords: Shakeouts, industry evolution, O-ring production functions. 
 
 
* Department of Economics, Florida International University, Miami, FL 33199, emails: pe-
ter.thompson2@fiu.edu and pinteam@fiu.edu. Thompson gratefully acknowledges financial support 
from the Kauffman Professors Program of the Eugenio Pino and Family Global Entrepreneurship 
Center. This paper has benefited from numerous conversations with Steven Klepper, who also 
kindly provided the data for Figure 1. 
 1
1. Introduction 
Many industries undergo a shakeout phase during which there is a rapid decline in the 
number of producers despite continued expansion of aggregate output. Gort and Klepper 
(1982) document the prevalence of shakeouts: of 46 industries for which they had col-
lected data, by the end of the sample period 36 had undergone or were undergoing a sig-
nificant shakeout. Among the nineteen industries that appeared to have completed the 
shakeout phase by the end of the sample period, the average decline in the number of 
producers was forty percent.1 
Figure 1 depicts the especially strong shakeout observed in the U.S. tire industry. The 
number of incumbents rose sharply in the early years as demand expanded, reaching a 
peak of 274 firms in 1922. After 1922, the entry rate fell while the exit rate rose sharply, 
leading to a rapid decline in the number of active producers. By 1936, there were only 49 
producers, with a further, modest, decline over the subsequent fifty years [Klepper and 
Simons (2000, pp. 731-2)]. Despite the decline in the number of firms, output rose and 
                                            
1. See Klepper and Graddy (1990) and Agarwal (1998) for updates of the Gort-Klepper data. 
Simons (2005) offers some international comparisons. 
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FIGURE 1. The shakeout in the U.S. tire industry, from 
Klepper and Simons (2000). 
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prices declined dramatically during the first forty years of the industry. For example, be-
tween 1914 and 1935, the wholesale price of tires fell by 75 percent, despite technical im-
provements that greatly increased their longevity.  
A number of explanations have been proposed for shakeouts. Utterback and Suárez 
(1993) and Hopenhayn (1993) attribute shakeouts to the emergence of a dominant design 
that precludes further entry while enhancing competition among incumbents. Jovanovic 
and MacDonald (1994) posit the introduction of a technological refinement that raises the 
minimum efficient scale of production. Klepper (1996) proposes that shakeouts are a 
natural consequence of advantages that accrue to early entrants because of increasing 
returns to scale, especially in R&D. Horvath, Schivardi, and Woywode (2003) suggest 
that shakeouts are simply a by-product of an earlier spike in entry by firms with hetero-
geneous quality [c.f. Jovanovic (1982)], and where the entry was induced by news sug-
gesting the industry is particularly profitable. Wang (2006) obtains a shakeout in a model 
where consumer adoption of the new product diffuses slowly and optimal firm size rises as 
a result of technical change.2  
Jovanovic and Tse (2006) point out that all these explanations are plausible. They then 
develop another explanation where shakeouts result from a spike in the fraction of firms 
whose capital requires wholesale replacement. We continue this theme by proposing an 
additional explanation, this time based on sorting of workers with heterogeneous ability. 
The essence of the model is as follows. A new industry consists of a number of firms, each 
of which employs exactly n workers. At the birth of the industry, workers are assigned to 
firms at random, but they soon discover that they vary in ability. The production func-
tion exhibits complementarity in worker abilities, so efficiency demands a reallocation of 
workers through positive sorting on ability [cf. Becker (1981), Kremer (1993)]. Frictions 
                                            
2. A number of theories have also been offered for shakeouts that simultaneously affect multiple 
sectors. Atkeson and Kehoe (1993) attribute such events to national economic reforms; Caballero 
and Hammour (1994) show how temporary declines in aggregate demand can eliminate less efficient 
firms; general purpose technologies that raise minimum efficient scales may also induce widespread 
shakeouts [c.f. Jovanovic and Rousseau (2006)]. However, Simons’ (2005) observation that the tim-
ing of shakeouts within industries are highly correlated across countries suggests that they are more 
frequently driven by industry-specific events. See also Wang’s (2006) analysis of shakeouts in televi-
sion receivers in the US and the UK.  
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in the labor market make this reallocation process a slow one. High-ability workers even-
tually are reallocated to firms that already have a preponderance of high-ability workers, 
while other firms retain only low-ability workers. Thus, some firms endogenously become 
high-quality while others become low quality. The output of high-quality firms rises, 
while that of low-quality firms declines. Eventually, low-quality firms are forced out. 
Complementarity of worker abilities and the incentives it creates for sorting among firms 
is familiar from Kremer’s (1993) O-ring theory of production. The model in this paper 
essentially adds frictions to the O-ring theory. But frictions do more than simply draw 
out the reallocation process. Indeed, they are an essential part of the story, because in a 
frictionless, competitive, world it does not hurt to be a low-quality firm. To see why fric-
tions are a necessary part of the shakeout story, consider the following version of 
Kremer’s theory. All firms require n workers, and production is given by 1 ,
n
ii θ=∏  where 
,iθ θ θ ∈    is worker i’s ability. If w(θ) denotes the wage of workers with ability θ, profits 
are { } ( )1 1max ,i
nn
i ii i wθ θ θ= =−∑∏  with first-order condition ( ),j ij i wθ θ≠ ′=∏  i =1, 2, . . ., 
n. Frictionless sorting implies that each firm only employs workers of identical ability, so 
( ) 1.nw θ θ −′ =  The wage then satisfies ( ) 1( ) ( ) .nw s ds nθθθ ω θ ω θ−′= + =∫ 3 Given this equi-
librium wage profile, the wage bill for a firm, ( ),nw θ  is ,nθ  and this is identical to out-
put. Thus all firms earn zero profit; they are indifferent about the ability of the workers 
they employ, as long as they are identical, and sorting cannot induce firm exit. To create 
a situation where it is more profitable to have high-ability workers, we need a setting in 
which the wage for ability increases at a rate less than the marginal product. This is what 
labor market frictions do. 
Although we use the generic term “worker”, it is probably already apparent that what we 
have in mind are certain types of key workers – perhaps the founding managers or, in 
technical industries, senior engineers and scientists. There is ample evidence relating the 
quality of workers at all levels to firm performance. At the top of the hierarchy, the qual-
ity of the founding management team has been shown to matter for the performance of 
young firms. For example, Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990) report that semiconductor 
                                            
3. It is easy to verify the sorting result. Consider a firm that has (n−1) workers with ability θ, and 
one with ability .θ  Profits are 1 1 1( 1) ,n n nn n nπ θθ θ θ− − −= − − −   which attains a maximum when 
.θ θ=  
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firms grew more rapidly the greater the industry experience of their founding teams, 
while Burton, Sørensen and Beckman (2002) find that Silicon Valley start-ups whose 
founders had been employed by prominent firms were more likely to obtain external fi-
nancing than were start-ups with less prominent backgrounds. Similarly, Klepper (2002, 
2007) provides detailed evidence that the fortunes of spinoffs in the U.S. automobile in-
dustry depended heavily upon the quality of the firm that had previously employed the 
spinoff’s founder, so much so that concentration of the industry around Detroit can be 
fully explained by the inheritance of skills by founders of spinoffs. Outside of high-
technology industries, Bates (1990) reports that the more educated is a male entering into 
self-employment, the more likely is his business to be in operation several years later. Yet 
others have shown that founder quality affects start-up size [e.g. Åstebro and Bernhardt 
(1999), Colombo, Delmastro, and Grili (2004)], and this is a known predictor of long-term 
survival [Geroski, Mata, and Portugal (2002), Thompson (2005)].  
Moving down the firm hierarchy, Zucker, Darby, and Armstrong (1998, 2002) have shown 
that biotechnology firms employing scientists good enough either to be, or to work with, 
“star scientists” are likely to be larger and more innovative. Knowing, this, firms’ loca-
tion choices are often influenced by the prior location of star scientists in academia 
[Zucker, Darby and Brewer (1998)]. There is also evidence of a positive association be-
tween firm performance and the quality of its labor force as a whole. It is generally 
known that larger firms pay higher wages, something that is on average true in our 
model, but this may in principle be due to payment of compensating differentials. How-
ever,  in a study of one million French workers, Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) 
conclude that three quarters of the relationship between firm size and wages is explained 
by individual worker effects, not firm effects.4  
Despite ample evidence linking the quality of workers at all levels to firm performance, 
there is unfortunately little direct evidence that variations in turnover rates by worker 
quality is a major determinant of performance. Given the extensive evidence linking 
worker and firm quality, one would imagine the effect of turnover to be self-evident. 
However, there is a particularly difficult issue of causality. For example, Lengermann and 
                                            
4. Abowd, Kramarz and Moreau (1996) also find a positive correlation between worker quality and 
product quality in French manufacturing. 
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Vilhuber (2002) document that high-quality workers are more likely to depart a firm in 
the years immediately before that firm exits. But it seems likely that firm difficulties are 
more obvious to high-quality workers, who anyway have better outside options. The evi-
dence in Lettermann and Vilhuber  is consistent with our model, but it is equally consis-
tent with a model in which emerging firm difficulties drive the best, most forward-
looking, workers away.  
The model is distinctive from much previous theorizing about shakeouts in that there is 
no technological change. Nonetheless, output is convex in firm quality, and even without 
exit of low-quality firms we observe rising output and productivity, and a declining price. 
The shakeout is characterized by a total suspension of entry followed by a more gradual 
decline, also eventually to zero, in the exit rate. The more rapidly labor is reallocated, the 
more quickly productivity rises, price falls, and the quicker the shakeout occurs. These 
correlations are consistent with the evidence in Jovanovic and Tse (2006, Figure 1). Real-
locations also induce a widening of the distributions across firms of productivity and firm 
size, consistent with the findings of Cabral and Mata (2003). 
The model also has some distinctive predictions about wages during the shakeout. Firms 
that ultimately survive the shakeout will see their average wage rising over time as they 
collect together workers of higher ability, while firms destined to exit will exhibit a de-
clining wage bill. Industry-wide, the wage-ability profile becomes steeper over time, as 
sorting raises the marginal product of ability. However, even within firms, identical work-
ers may earn different wages. An individual’s earnings depend upon his career history. In 
particular, the higher the productivity of the firms for which an individual had previously 
worked, the higher will be his current wage, even controlling for ability. Finally, the haz-
ard of job switching declines with experience, because previous moves raise the worker’s 
reservation wage. These implications are consistent with evidence from a number of data 
sets. 
The model does not always produce shakeouts. When ability varies only modestly be-
tween workers, worker reallocations are infrequent and few firms suffer losses of unusually 
valuable employees. In this case, industry dynamics are muted: there are only modest 
changes in the number of active firms, price and output, and little change in the distribu-
tion of firm size. When entry costs are high, market price is high and even low-quality 
firms can make positive profits. Thus, there is no wholesale exit. Nonetheless, in this case, 
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one still observes the changes in output, wages and firm size that accompany shakeouts. 
At the other extreme, with very low entry costs, there is a dramatic decline in the num-
ber of active firms. However, neither entry nor exit decline to zero. Instead, there is sus-
tained turnover of active firms. Somewhat surprisingly, the shakeout with low entry costs 
is not accompanied by increased output. 
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and derives some basic 
properties. The behavior of the model becomes quite complex after the first round of la-
bor reallocation, so Section 3 explores industry dynamics by computational means. Sec-
tion 4 concludes. 
2. The Model 
At the birth of a new industry, firms are created by bringing together n individuals, each 
of whom has ability indexed by (0,1)i Uθ ∼ . At the time of hiring, neither the firm nor 
the workers know their ability in this new industry, and all must be paid the reservation 
wage w in the first period. The creation of the firm requires the payment of a sunk cost, 
k. Firms are myopic, caring only about current-period profits. The production function 
for a firm is 
 
1
n
i
i
y n β θ1+
=
= ∏ . (1) 
The price is p(Y), where Y is industry output. Each firm takes the price as given. First-
period profit, gross of the entry cost, is 
 
1
( )
n
i
i
p Y n wnβπ θ1+
=
= −∏ . (2) 
Let 1
n
iiθ θ== ∏  index the “quality” of the firm, and let [ ]nE θ  denote its expected value 
when n workers are hired. Treating n as a continuous variable,5 the first-order condition 
for risk-neutral firms is 
                                            
5. The simulations in Section 3 do not use this sleight of hand, instead recognizing that n is an in-
teger. 
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 [ ](1 ) [ ]
( )
n
n
dE wE n
dn n p Yβ
θβ θ+ + = . (3) 
With entry cost k, free entry implies 
 1( ) [ ]n
wn kp Y
n Eβ θ+
+≤ . (4) 
When entry is positive, (4) holds as an equality, in which case the industry price can be 
denoted by p . Substituting (4) into (3) to eliminate price yields 
 ln [ ]
ln
nd E k
d n wn k
θ β = − +   + . (5) 
The optimality condition relates the elasticity of θ with respect to employment to the 
parameters of the model. Expected quality declines when employment is increased, but 
this is offset by an increase in output from having additional workers at a rate that de-
pends on β. The optimal elasticity also depends on k because entry costs determine the 
scale of entry and, consequently, price.  
The density of the product of n random variables drawn from a standard uniform distri-
bution is [Springer and Thompson (1966)] 
 
( ) 11ln
( ) , [0, 1]
( 1)!
n
n n
θφ θ θ
−−
= ∈− , (6) 
and so the elasticity on the L.H.S. of (5) can be written as 
 
( ) ( )
( )
1
1
0
1
1
0
ln( ) ln ln( )
( ) ( )
ln( )
n
n
n d
n n n
d
θ
θ θ θ θ
ε ψ
θ θ θ
−
−
− − −
= −
− −
∫
∫
, (7) 
where ψ(n) is the digamma function. The elasticity is strictly decreasing in n, with 
(0) 1θε = , and lim ( )n nθε→∞ = −∞ . The R.H.S. of (5) is strictly increasing in n, begin-
ning at (1 )β− +  when n=0, and rising to −β as n → ∞ . Thus there exists a unique em-
ployment level, ( , , )n k wβ , that satisfies (5). It is easy to verify that n  is increasing in β 
and k, and decreasing in w, as one would expect. The method of transformations yields 
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the p.d.f. for output, 
 
( ) 11 1 1
1
ln
( ) , 0,
( 1)!
n
n
n y
y y n
n n
β
β
βφ
−+ −
+
+
 = ∈   −


  , (8) 
and the p.d.f. for first-period profits, gross of the sunk cost, 
 
( )
( )( )
1
[ ] ln
( ) [ ]
( ) , ,
( 1)!
1 [ ] / [ ] ,
n
n
n
n
n n
k wnE
wn E
wn
k wn n
k E wn E
θ π θφ π π
θ θ
− +  ⋅    +  = ∈ −+ −
+ − 




 

 

 (9) 
where [ ]nE θ  is readily obtained from (6).  
Figure 2 plots a typical p.d.f. for first-period profit. Firms with the worst draws of θ earn 
negative profit and exit immediately. Firms with intermediate quality earn positive profit 
that is insufficient to cover the sunk entry cost, but these firms do not exit. Both profits 
and output are positively skewed, although at this point in time employment is the same 
in all firms.  
FIGURE 2. Density of profits in period 1 (gross of sunk entry cost). 
0
f(π)
π−n
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2.1 Industry dynamics without worker reallocation 
Industry dynamics are mundane without sorting. All firms that earned negative profits in 
the first period exit. Their exit induces an incipient price increase that is quashed by the 
entry of new firms. Because the survivors from period 1 produced more than the firms 
that exited, the number of new entrants in period 2 necessary to keep the price at the 
zero profit level indicated by (4) is less than the number of firms that exited. Each period 
the process repeats. A constant fraction of new entrants exit after one period of produc-
tion, and they are replaced by a smaller number of entrants. Eventually, the number of 
firms making positive profits has risen sufficiently to preclude further entry. 
The net effect is to create an industry in which price remains constant. Firms that sur-
vive their first period of production survive for ever. They do not grow, but selection 
raises the average output of firms. Finally, the number of active firms, entry rates, and 
exit rates decline monotonically over time. These are not the dynamics we typically ob-
serve. 
2.2 Voluntary departures with downward wage rigidity 
We describe a simple model of worker reallocation. At the end of the first period, abilities 
are known to all. A firm would then prefer to lower the wages of workers that have 
turned out to be low ability. Because the initial wage was set at the reservation level, any 
worker whose wage is reduced would immediately leave the new industry, so such wage 
reductions are equivalent to dismissal. However, we assume that a firm cannot lower 
wages.6  
At the end of the first period, firms are randomly assigned to one of two groups of equal 
size. One group consists of firms that will make an offer to an employee of another firm, 
the other consists of firms with employees receiving offers. Firms are matched in pairs, 
again at random, and the offering firm makes an offer of employment to a random mem-
ber of the receiving firm with which it is paired. The wage offered depends upon the 
quality of the offering firm, the quality of the receiving firm, and the worker’s ability. 
The offering firm makes a wage offer that is the lowest necessary to induce the worker to 
                                            
6. Research on high-quality datasets finds strong evidence for pervasive downward wage rigidity 
[Altonji and Devereux (1999), Wilson (1999), Lebow, Saks, and Wilson (2003)]. 
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move, as long as this does not exceed the marginal product of the worker at the offering 
firm. The receiving firm may make a counteroffer, if doing so is profitable. If the counter-
offer is not successful or the receiving firm chooses not to make a counteroffer, the worker 
moves to the offering firm. The receiving firm may, if it is profitable to do so, immedi-
ately replace the worker with a new hire. The new hire is drawn from outside the indus-
try, has an unknown ability, and is paid the reservation wage, w. 
Let the individual receiving an offer be worker i, let RMPi  denote his marginal product 
with the receiving firm, and let OMPi  his prospective marginal product with the offering 
firm. We consider first wage offers and counteroffers that may be made in the first round 
of reallocations. These are RMPi  if 
O RMP MPi i w> ≥ , and w if O RMP MPi iw> ≥ . In 
contrast, the receiving firm makes a successful counteroffer of OMPi  if 
R NMP MPi i w≥ > . 
Finally, if OMPiw >  i remains with his current employer at the wage w. The value of 
output lost if i leaves the receiving firm is 
 R 1 1MP ( ) ( 1)i i j
j i
p Y n nβ βθ θ+ +
≠
 = − −  ∏  , (10) 
where jj i θ≠∏  is the ability index of i’s colleagues. If i relocates his marginal product will 
be 
 O 1 1OMP ( ) ( 1)i ip Y n n
β βθ θ + + = + −   , (11) 
where Oθ  is the quality of the offering firm.  
Figure 3 illustrates the effect of a worker’s ability on his marginal product with his cur-
rent employer and with the offering firm. The lines O and R plot the marginal productiv-
ity with the offering firm and receiving firm respectively, which are negative for low-
ability workers. Note that, because the offering firm is contemplating increasing its size 
above n  and the receiving firm is contemplating losing a worker, the ability level at 
which the marginal product becomes positive is greater for the offering firm, regardless of 
firm qualities. A worker is more valuable to the offering firm if his ability exceeds *1θ . 
However, his value at this point does not exceed the reservation wage, w, so the offering 
firm does not succeed in recruiting him. In contrast, any worker with ability exceeding *2θ  
is offered a wage that induces him to change employers. For workers with ability in the 
range * *2 3,iθ θ θ ∈     the offered wage is w. For workers with 
*
3 ,1iθ θ ∈    , the offered wage is 
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given by the line R. Thus, the bold line def depicts the offered wages as a function of 
worker ability. 
Figure 3 illustrates a case in which the receiving firm can never make a successful 
counteroffer. Figure 3 provides an example in which it can. An increase in the quality of 
the receiving firm rotates R counterclockwise around point a. Thus, Figure 4 shows a re-
ceiving firm that is higher quality than in Figure 3. In this case, it can fend off outside 
bids for any worker with ability * *2 3,iθ θ θ ∈    , but it continues to lose workers with ability 
*
3 ,1iθ θ ∈    . Wages earned by a worker that receives an offer are indicated by the bold 
segment def. Of course, if the quality of the receiving firm relative to the offering firm is 
sufficiently great, then there is no worker that the offering firm can successfully recruit. 
Before this point is reached, however, the ability level above which the offering firm must 
offer a wage in excess of w declines as the quality of the current employer rises. If a 
worker exceeds this critical ability, the wage that must be paid by the offering firm in-
creases with ability at a greater rate.  
Industry dynamics with worker reallocation are quite rich. They are also complicated, 
and so we defer to Section 3 a computational analysis of the dynamics. In the remainder 
FIGURE 3. Marginal productivities, firm quality and worker ability (no 
successful counteroffers). First round of reallocations. 
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of this section, we summarize some basic implications of the model. Some of these clearly 
underlie industry dynamics that may lead to shakeouts; others are complications of ambi-
guity that make simulation necessary. 
P1. (a) The probability that a worker with ability θ receives an offer in excess of w is in-
creasing in θ. (b) The probability he receives a counteroffer is increasing in  θ. 
These properties are immediate consequences of the fact that a worker’s marginal product 
at any firm is increasing in his ability. 
P2. The probability that the offering firm is successful in recruitment is increasing in the 
quality of the offering firm. 
P2 is evident from Figures 3 and 4. An increase in the quality of the offering firm rotates 
O counterclockwise around point b. Hence, for any given quality of receiving firm, *2θ  in 
Figure 3 moves left, as does *3θ  in Figure 4. This expands the range of worker abilities 
over which the offering firm outbids both the reservation wage and any counteroffer, 
thereby raising the probability that a worker contacted at random is recruited.  
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate possibilities that arise when the offering firm has at least as 
FIGURE 4. Marginal productivities, firm quality and worker ability (with suc-
cessful counteroffers for some employees). First round of reallocations. 
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many employees as the receiving firm. But in later rounds of reallocations, it is possible 
that the offering firm has fewer employees. From (11) it is clear that sensitivity of mar-
ginal productivity to worker quality increases with firm size. Consequently, a reduction in 
the size of the offering firm flattens the marginal productivity schedule, as well as shifting 
its intersection with the reservation wage to the left. Figure 5 shows that if the offering 
firm is sufficiently small relative to the receiving firm, it may successfully recruit workers 
of intermediate ability while being unable to recruit the highest-ability workers. However, 
an increase in the quality of the offering firm moves *2θ  to the left and *3θ  to the right, 
thereby expanding the ranges of abilities that are successfully recruited. Thus, P2 applies 
regardless of the sizes of the offering and receiving firms.  
P3. The probability that the receiving firm loses a targeted worker is decreasing in the 
ability of the worker’s colleagues. 
A counterclockwise rotation of R in Figures 4 and 5 expands the range of abilities for 
which counteroffers are successful. 
P4. (a) Output of the offering firm increases whenever it recruits a worker. (b) Every 
worker transfer yields an increase in industry output. 
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FIGURE 5. Recruitment and counteroffers when the offering firm is smaller 
than the receiving firm. 
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Part (a) of P4 follows from the simple fact that no worker is recruited unless his marginal 
productivity in the offering firm is positive. Part (b) follows because every transfer in-
volves an increase in the offering firm’s output that exceeds the loss in output of the re-
ceiving firm.7 In Figures 2 and 3, any time a worker is made a wage offer, his marginal 
product at the receiving firm is positive. Thus, in the first period of reallocations, every 
firm that loses a worker suffers a decline in output. But this is not always the case in 
subsequent periods, when the offering firm may have fewer employees than the receiving 
firm. In such a case it is possible for a worker’s marginal product to exceed his reserva-
tion wage at the offering firm but be negative at the receiving firm.    
P5. (a) Every successful recruitment raises the profit of the offering firm. (b) Every suc-
cessful counteroffer lowers the profit of the receiving firm. 
There is almost no case in which a successful bid by the offering firm requires it to pay 
the marginal product of the worker it recruits. Thus, successful recruitment raises profit. 
The effect of losing a worker on the receiving firm’s profit is more complicated, even in 
the first period of reallocations. Consider first Figure 3. If the lost employee has ability 
*
3 ,1iθ θ ∈    , then the receiving firm loses output that exceeds the wage it was paying. In 
contrast, if the worker has ability * *2 3,iθ θ θ ∈     the reduction in the wage bill exceeds the 
lost output, and profit rises. In Figure 4, however, profit always declines when the receiv-
ing firm loses a worker. Moreover, it also sees profit decline if it defends against an out-
side bid with a successful counteroffer (in this case it preserves output but suffers an in-
crease in its wage bill). The connecting theme in the two figures is that the receiving firm 
loses profit whenever it responds to a bid for one of its workers with a counteroffer, 
whether or not the counteroffer is successful. In contrast, it gains profit whenever it loses 
a worker to whom it did not extend a counteroffer. This dependency on the counteroffer 
decision of the response of profits to losing a worker applies also after the first round of 
reallocations 
2.3 Discussion 
When workers switch employers, they will tend to do so by abandoning low-quality firms 
                                            
7. Unless, of course, the loss of a worker induces the receiving firm to exit. 
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for high-quality firms. All reallocations raise industry output, so that price is non-
increasing, and is likely eventually to be strictly decreasing. We can say rather more in 
the first round of worker reallocation. The best workers are the ones most likely to switch 
employers. As a consequence, worker reallocations in the first round induce a widening of 
the quality distribution. The size distribution, whether measured by employment or by 
output, also widens. 
The implications of the model rapidly become more complicated after the first round. The 
first complication arises when offering firms have fewer employers than receiving firms. In 
these cases, offering firms do not successfully recruit the best employees, but they can 
recruit workers with intermediate ability levels. Second, the assumption that abilities are 
random draws from the standard uniform distribution yields a tractable distribution for 
firm quality upon entry, but this tractability quickly breaks down. Worker reallocations 
change both the distribution of employment numbers and the distribution of abilities 
across firms in a non-random fashion. In addition, exit of contracting firms removes from 
the pool firms whose workers are concentrated at the left of the ability distribution. Thus 
the distribution of ability in the industry population of abilities soon departs from the 
standard uniform.8 Third, exit of low-quality firms creates additional uncertainties, be-
cause whether their exit induces an additional wave of entry must remain for the moment 
a matter of speculation. On the one hand, reallocation may proceed sufficiently slowly 
that exits due to worker losses only happen after entry has dried up. In this case, by the 
time these exits begin to occur the increase in average firm output may have already 
driven price well below the level defined by the zero-profit condition. Because the loss in 
output caused by exits may easily exceed the gain in output from expanding firms, indus-
try output need not rise monotonically and price need not decline monotonically. On the 
other hand, a quicker process of reallocation-induced exit may lead to exits before price 
has fallen, which in turn creates an incipient price increase that induces additional entry. 
Examining which of these effects is likely to dominate also requires a simulation ap-
proach.  
Despite these complications, the model also has some distinctive predictions for individual 
                                            
8. In fact, tractability breaks down even in the first round for uniform distributions with a range 
different from the unit interval. 
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careers and intra-firm wage structures. First, identical workers at the same firm may earn 
different wages. Second, wages earned by workers that have changed jobs depend upon 
their career histories. In particular, the higher the productivity of the firms for which an 
individual had previously worked, the higher will be his current wage, even controlling for 
ability. Third, the hazard of job switching declines with experience, because previous 
moves raise the worker’s reservation wage.  A fourth implication for workers concerns the 
experience-earnings profile. Thompson (2003) has documented that experience-earnings 
profiles are steeper when technology is younger. His analysis was a test of the vintage 
human capital model of Chari and Hopenhayn (1991), but it is also an implication of our 
model: later entrants experience slower gains in wages, because the rate at which workers 
receive competitive outside bids declines as the industry ages. 
3. Industry Dynamics 
Simulation of the model was carried out in MATLAB.9 The production technology is as 
described in the previous section, with individual abilities drawn from the uniform distri-
bution on ,θ θ   . Demand takes the constant elasticity form, Y Ap ε−= . For some pa-
rameter values, the model generates dynamics consistent with a strong shakeout. How-
ever, as will become readily apparent, the shakeout typically begins immediately. We be-
gin in subsection 3.1 with a review of simulations for parameter values that generate a 
shakeout. Subsection 3.2 describes the changes in parameters that preclude shakeouts. 
3.1 Shakeout dynamics 
We report the results of a simulation using the following parameters. 0.4,θ =  0.8,θ =  
2,β = 1,w =  3.73,k =  31, 822A = , and 4ε = . These parameter values induce an ini-
tial entry of 5,000 firms, each employing five workers, and an equilibrium initial price of 
0.9.p = 10 Although each run of the model is stochastic, the large number of initial en-
trants leads to extremely stable behavior across runs. 
                                            
9. The program is available at http://www.fiu.edu/~thompsop. 
10. The program requests the desired number of firms and the initial price and then generates the 
values of A and k that induces these desired values. 
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Figures 6 presents the entry and exit rates as well as the number of incumbents in each 
of 300 periods simulated. At the end of the first period, over 16 percent of the initial en-
trants choose to exit after suffering negative profits. After reallocation of workers and the 
resulting increase in output of surviving firms, a little less than half of the exiting firms 
are replaced by new entrants. Entry of new firms dries up almost immediately, the last 
entrants being in the second period. In contrast, the exit rate remains positive for some 
considerable time. It does not decline monotonically, but there is clearly a declining trend 
toward zero. Figure 7 shows the net effect on the number of active firms in the industry, 
which does decline monotonically. Reallocation of workers induces firms to exit, both be-
cause price is declining and because some firms fall below the optimum size as a result of 
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losing workers to poaching firms. Eventually, however, reallocation becomes increasingly 
rare, and the number of incumbents approaches a steady-state, in this case with about 65 
percent of the number of firms that initially entered. 
Figure 8 shows the effects of reallocation and exit on price and industry output. The for-
mer declines while the latter rises, both at more or less a declining rate. In neither case is 
the change monotonic: in some periods the lost output from exiting firms exceeds the ex-
pansion in output from growing firms, but this is the exception rather than the rule. Fig-
ure 9 shows that the average wage initially grows rapidly before approaching an upper 
bound, in this case about twice the starting wage. A worker’s wage only increases if he 
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changes employers or receives a counteroffer to an outside bid, and many workers are 
never the target of a recruitment bid. Thus, the considerable rise in average wage is 
driven by a large increase in wage dispersion. This is documented in Figure 10, which 
shows the density of wages at three points in time. Note in each case the persistence of a 
mass point at w=1; these are the wages of workers that never received an offer from an 
outside firm.  
Just as the dispersion of wages increases, so does the dispersion of firm size, whether 
measured by employment (Figure 11, left panel), or output (Figure 11, right panel). The 
left panel reveals an initially sharp mode in the density of employment at n=5, which 
decays only slowly with the passage of time. Note that about fifteen percent of incumbent 
FIGURE 10. Density of wages  at t=5, t =100, and t =300. 
-20 0 20 40 60 80 100
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
FIGURE 11. Density of employment (left panel) and output (right panel)  at t=5, t =100, 
and t =300. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
g p
t= 5
t = 100
t= 300
 20
firms have reduced their workforce to four employees. These are low-quality firms that 
cannot justify hiring from outside the industry. Presumably, because there are no incum-
bents with only three employees, a firm that is sufficiently low quality that it chooses not 
to replace two workers lost to other firms is never profitable. The right panel does not 
reveal quite as strong a mode (note the change in scale) because firm output is a continu-
ous random variable even upon entry with n=5. The evolution of the size distribution of 
firms – characterized by increasing mean and dispersion – is consistent with the empirical 
evidence reported in Cabral and Mata (2003). 
3.2 Industries without shakeouts 
For many parameter values, the model does not generate shakeouts with rising output 
and falling price. To conserve space, we consider in this subsection just two parameter 
variations, the entry cost, k, and the range, ,θ θ   , of abilities in the population.  
Figure 12 reports the simulated patterns of entry and exit when the cost of entry is 
greatly reduced to k=0.2. In contrast to the simulation in the previous section, when k 
was about 3.7, entry and exit persist at significant levels throughout the entire simulation 
period. At first, exit rates exceed entry rates, so there is a marked decline in the number 
of active firms, characteristic of a shakeout. However, by t=150 or so, entry and exit 
rates are almost equal. As a group of firms exits, a group of almost the same size enters 
FIGURE 12. Entry and exit rates, and active firms for k=0.2. Entry and 
exit rates are percentages of incumbents. Number of active firms is a 
percentage of the initial entry cohort size). 
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to replace them. In contrast to the previous section, then, there is sustained turnover in 
the members of the industry. However, for k=0.2, there is no increase in output and no 
reduction in price. In fact, the simulations yield price and output levels at t=300 almost 
identical to those observed at t=0 (not shown). In view of the sustained entry seen in 
Figure 12, this should not be surprising. If there is positive entry, price cannot have fallen 
below the level determined in equilibrium at the birth of the industry, and of course if 
price does not fall then output does not rise. Clearly, with output constant and the num-
ber of firms declining by over 75 percent, there is a marked rise in average output. It is 
also the case that the dispersion of output greatly increases, as illustrated in Figure 13. 
Consider now the other extreme, when k is very large. For values of k in excess of twenty, 
there is no exit and consequently no entry. The reasoning is straightforward. When entry 
costs are high, the equilibrium number of entrants at the birth of the industry is small 
and price is high. Reallocation of workers without exits unambiguously raise output and 
reduce price, precluding any subsequent entry. Firms may then lose a number of key 
workers but nonetheless make positive profits as all incumbents are protected behind the 
entry barrier. For large entry costs, then, there is no shakeout, but price falls and output 
rises. 
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Figure 14 summarizes the effects of changes in entry cost on the “terminal” industry size 
and output (calculated when t=300, after which there is very little change). For very low 
entry costs, there is a dramatic drop in the number of active firms, but very little in-
crease in aggregate output. At the other extreme, there is no decline in the number of 
active firms, but a considerable increase in output. What we have in mind as a typical 
shakeout, with rising output and a declining number of active firms, occurs with interme-
diate value for the entry cost.11  
We turn next to a change in the distribution of worker abilities. A reduction in the range 
of abilities has a moderating effect on industry dynamics.12 First, labor reallocations are 
less frequent, because it is less likely that an additional worker will be more productive at 
an expanding firm than at a contracting firm. When reallocations do occur, they lead to 
smaller variations in wages and smaller increases in aggregate output. Losing a worker is 
also less likely to force a firm out of business. To the contrary, the firm is usually able to 
                                            
11. A curious feature in Figure 14 is the decline in terminal industry output as k is increased be-
yond twenty. This decline in terminal output appears to be driven by the absence of selection: exits 
remove unproductive firms from the market, leaving room for more productive firms to expand.  
12. These effects are sufficiently intuitive that we shall not reproduce graphs of simulations here. 
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hire a replacement with similar abilities from outside the industry, and as a result it is 
only modestly affected by the loss of an employee. In the limit, as all workers become 
identical, all industry dynamics vanish. 
4. Conclusions 
There are a number of plausible models generating industry shakeouts. These theories are 
not mutually exclusive, and in this paper we have presented an additional mechanism. 
We combine the strong skill complementarity in Kremer’s (1993) O-ring theory of pro-
duction with a frictional sorting process. As high-skill and low-skill workers are gradually 
collected together within firms, firms endogenously sort themselves along a continuum of 
quality. Firms that find themselves only with low-skill workers, are eventually forced out 
of the industry. Surviving firms expand output and aggregate output rises alongside a 
decline in the number of active firms.  
Although the simulations reported in this section generates shakeouts with increasing 
output, the growth in output per firm is modest in comparison with those observed in 
industry data. In part, this is due to the stylized nature of the model. But, more impor-
tant, we do not claim that the labor reallocation process we model is the only, nor even 
the most important, driving force for shakeouts. Without doubt, firms increase productiv-
ity even without acquiring high-quality workers, either through passive learning or active 
research.  
A notable feature of the shakeouts generated by the model is that they begin immedi-
ately. Figure 1, however, depicts a process in which the number of active firms first rose 
and then fell in the tire industry, and this is typical of most industries that experience 
shakeouts. We do not see this in our model because we have not modeled an extended 
process of industry birth. The number of active firms may experience a period of pro-
tracted growth prior to the shakeout either because demand for the industry’s output 
grows over the early years of the industry, or because there is a limit at any point in time 
to the number of entrepreneurs that have the relevant skills to enter. Certainly, in the 
case of the tire industry, demand could only grow over a period of many years in lock 
step with the expansion of the automobile industry. Incorporating this protracted birth 
into the simulations would of course be straightforward, but doing so would provide little 
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additional insight. 
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